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I. INTRODUCTION
Incarcerated in a federal detention center1 for over two years and
awaiting deportation to his native Mexico, Ricardo Oviedo-Cortez dreamed
of once again walking his then seven-year old daughter to school as a
free man in the United States of America, the country he called home for
almost thirty years.2 Oviedo-Cortez’s journey to federal confinement
1. Oviedo-Cortez was detained at the CCA Detention Center, also commonly
referred to as the San Diego Detention Center. The CCA is a privately run detention
facility that temporarily houses noncitizen detainees pending their immigration proceeding
under a contractual arrangement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
See CCA Detention Center, SAN DIEGO IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://immigrantsandiego.org/2010/01/12/cca-detention-center/.
2. See letter from Oviedo-Cortez to author (Mar. 15, 2012) (on file with author).
Oviedo-Cortez was raised in Tijuana, Mexico. He first came to the United States as a
teenager, but returned to Mexico to perform compulsory military service. After another brief
stay in the United Sates, Oviedo-Cortez again returned back to Mexico where he briefly
worked as a Tijuana police officer. In 1983, unable to make a sustainable living as a police
officer because of his unwillingness to accept bribes and because the peso was then
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began on the evening of December 2, 2009, when he entered a San
Diego Wal-Mart with a forged Arizona driver’s license bearing the name
Dr. Smith,3 a person whose identity had been stolen. Oviedo-Cortez hoped
to use this fabricated driver’s license to execute an emergency wire transfer
from Dr. Smith’s American Express account. Oviedo-Cortez walked up
to the attendant at the Wal-Mart Money Gram counter and presented
himself as Dr. Smith, but before he could complete the wire transfer, he
was arrested and detained.
Oviedo-Cortez pled guilty to one count of false personation under
section 530.5(a) of the California Penal Code and was ultimately ordered
to pay $1,000 in restitution4 and sentenced to 200 days of confinement.
If Oviedo-Cortez were a United States citizen, he would have been able
to return home following his state incarceration and carry on with his
life. However, because Oviedo-Cortez is a Mexican citizen (albeit a then
legal permanent resident of the United States), the Department of Homeland
Security [“DHS” or “Government”] initiated removal proceedings against
Oviedo-Cortez immediately following his state incarceration, wrongfully
claiming that his conviction was an aggravated felony, thus making
Oviedo-Cortez removable from the United States.5
As a result of the Government’s dogged pursuit of its unjust deportation
claims, Oviedo-Cortez was detained and not released from custody until
March 2012—two years later. After enduring numerous legal proceedings
before the immigration court, the Board of Immigration Appeals [“BIA”],
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Oviedo-Cortez was eventually
able to return home to his family.
The Government’s claimed linchpin for Oviedo-Cortez’s deportation
and the resulting lengthy legal battle was an unsigned pre-sentencing
report that proclaimed, with no detailed support, that Oviedo-Cortez’s
actions resulted in approximately $24,000 in loss to an unidentified group of
experiencing significant devaluations, Oviedo-Cortez again returned to the United States.
In 2002, Oviedo-Cortez was granted lawful permanent residence status in the United
States. Brief for Petitioner at 5, 9, Oviedo-Cortez v. Holder, No. 11-70404 (9th Cir.
Nov. 18, 2011).
3. The real name is replaced with the pseudonym Smith.
4. In a non pro tunc order, the criminal trial court reduced the amount of
restitution from $24,000 to $1,000. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 12–13.
5. According to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, any alien is removable if
convicted of an aggravated felony. Please note that the author intends to use the terms
“alien” and “noncitizen” interchangeably. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
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victims. That was all the evidence the Government offered to satisfy its
burden that Oviedo-Cortez had, in fact, caused over $10,000 in loss, as
required by section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act [“INA”]. There were no trial court orders, no admissions, and no other
physical evidence of any kind to support the Government’s deportation
allegations. All the Government could produce was this one inherently
untrustworthy document riddled with multiple layers of hearsay.
One might wonder how the Government could lead the immigration
judge and the BIA down such a path of clear error, especially since prior
to 2009, most immigration courts would never have accepted a presentencing report as sufficient evidence to prove removability.6 Indeed,
at one point in the proceedings, the immigration judge remarked to
Oviedo-Cortez:
[A]t this point, I do not believe the Government has sustained the charge that
you have been convicted of an aggravated felony for fraud because there is
nothing in [the Complaint or plea agreement] to indicate that the loss to the
victim was $10,000 or more.7

This journey of compounded error began with the Government’s
tenacious insistence that the United States Supreme Court in 2009 somehow
changed the playing field in favor of deportation by opening the floodgates
to the admission of all evidence in the criminal record to assist in
satisfying the Government’s burden of persuasion. Thus, the Government
successfully dangled a single unreliable document and its misinterpretation
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nijhawan v. Holder8 in front of the
immigration judge and the BIA to justify Oviedo-Cortez’s detention and
deportation.
Finally, after an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Oviedo-Cortez’s prolonged
legal fight came to end.9 Oviedo-Cortez’s opening brief filed before the
Ninth Circuit forced the Government to come to grips with reality. It
was only then that the Government agreed to file a Joint Motion to Remand
to the BIA, articulating that “[b]ecause the record does not support the
conclusion that the crime for which [Oviedo-Cortez] was convicted
resulted in a loss to the victim exceeding $10,000, as required by the

6. See Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Ochoa-Fernandez, 168 F. App’x. 291, 293 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. ValenzuelaHernandez, 72 F. App’x. 686, 686 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Varela-Marquez, 45
F. App’x. 820, 820 (9th Cir. 2002).
7. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 14.
8. See Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
9. The author, director of the University of San Diego School of Law Appellate
Clinic, represented Oviedo-Cortez before the Ninth Circuit and upon remand to the BIA.
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removal statute, remand to the [BIA] is appropriate.”10 On March 6, 2012,
Oviedo-Cortez’s nightmare ended with the BIA’s order terminating the
removal proceedings “[i]n light of the Ninth Circuit’s order and the parties’
joint motion” that Oviedo-Cortez is not removable as charged under
section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA.11
Unfortunately, Oviedo-Cortez’s situation is not an isolated incidence
of Government overzealous deportation. It is instead an example of an
alarming trend in U.S. immigration courts. With over 4,000 aliens deported
in 2011 for “fraudulent activities” alone,12 we must all be watchful that
the DHS adheres to the law and properly meets its burden of proof in all
removal proceedings.13
The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the government’s
misinterpretation of the central holding in Nijhawan v. Holder and how
it has led to the improper dilution of evidentiary standards in removal
proceedings when determining the $10,000 threshold loss requirement
under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the INA [hereinafter “M(i)”]. Section II
of this article provides a brief doctrinal overview and summary of my
proposed procedural methodology; sections III and IV provide essential
background information regarding the Supreme Court’s important preNijhawan opinions and the inconsistent methods circuit courts have applied
when calculating the monetary threshold under the fraud or deceit
deportation statute prior to Nijhawan; section V provides a detailed
analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nijhawan; section VI analyzes
post-Nijhawan cases and highlights the misapplication of the Nijhawan
rule; and section VII discusses and articulates what evidence the
immigration court should admit in a circumstance-specific analysis when
determining the loss during a deportation proceeding.

10. Joint Motion to Remand to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Oveido-Cortez
v. Holder, No. 11-70404 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2012).
11. Matter of Oviedo-Cortez, 2012 WL 911867, at *1 (B.I.A. Mar. 6, 2012).
12. JOHN SIMANSKI & LESLEY SAPP, ANNUAL REPORT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2011, DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, at 6. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement_ar_2011.pdf.
13. Under the INA, the government bears the burden of proving, by clear
and convincing evidence, that a legal permanent resident is deportable. INA
§ 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012); 8 CFR § 1240.8(a) (2012).
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II. DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED
PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK
The INA dictates that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”14 Federal immigration
law also proscribes the Attorney General from, in any way, “granting
discretionary relief from removal to an aggravated felon, no matter how
compelling his case.”15 This statutory scheme defines “aggravated felony”
by setting out a long list of enumerated crimes, one of which is any
“offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or
victims exceeds $10,000.”16
The INA fails to “prescribe a detailed methodology for determining
whether a predicate offense fits within these definitions (and, thus, qualifies
as an aggravated felony).”17 In the absence of statutory direction, the
federal circuits and the immigration courts routinely, albeit inconsistently,
apply some form of the Supreme Court’s categorical approach as conceived
in Taylor v. United States,18 to determine precisely when a prior conviction
qualifies as an aggravated felony within the meaning of the INA.19
In 2009, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nijhawan v. Holder attempted
to resolve the inconsistencies that had emerged in immigration courts

14. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
15. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013).
16. INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012).
17. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2006).
18. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). The Taylor categorical approach
has properly served as guidance for the immigration courts because, like the sentencing
court in Taylor, an immigration court can only “act within an administrative system
addressing the federal statutory consequences of convictions that criminal court judges
have already adjudicated.” Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions:
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1675–
76 (2011).
19. Conteh, 461 F.3d at 52; see also Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183,
185–86 (2007) (“In determining whether a conviction (say, a conviction for violating a
state criminal law that forbids the taking of property without permission) falls within the
scope of a listed offense (e.g., ‘theft offense’), the lower courts uniformly have applied
the approach this Court set forth in Taylor v. United States.”). The categorical approach
has been applied in the immigration context even before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Taylor. See Das, supra note 18, at 1688 (explaining the history of federal immigration
law and the traditional use of the categorical analysis in the immigration context as “one
that limited the immigration adjudicator’s assessment of a past criminal conviction to a
legal analysis of the statutory offense rather than a review of the facts underlying the
crime”); see also id. at 1749 (Appendix containing decisions of pre-Taylor federal courts,
including Attorney General and Board of Immigration Appeals decisions demonstrating
the history of categorical analysis in immigration law).
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and federal circuit courts across the country as to how to determine the
financial threshold under M(i) (the aggravated felony provision for “fraud
or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000”).
Not surprisingly, in Nijhawan, the Government wanted the Court to
abandon the categorical approach in favor of a method wherein any and
all information found in the criminal defendant’s file could be used to
show damages exceeding $10,000.20 The petitioner, on the other hand,
wanted the Court to keep the categorical approach and only allow
aggravated felony status if the monetary threshold was actually part of
the conviction itself.21
In Nijhawan, the Court rejected all forms of the categorical approach
in favor of a circumstance-specific analysis when determining the monetary
threshold contained in this INA section. Unlike the categorical approach,
which has always prevented immigration courts from looking “‘to the
facts of the particular prior case,’”22 the circumstance-specific approach
allows for an examination, in immigration court, of the “particular
circumstances in which an offender committed the crime on a particular
occasion.”23 Regrettably, the Court’s opinion, narrow in parts and vague
in others, has led to an even more inconsistent and questionable application
of immigration law. The Government believes that once the Supreme Court
rejected the categorical approach for determining the monetary threshold,
the Court also somehow declared “open season” on hunting down and
using any information from the criminal defendant’s file. A close
examination of the Nijhawan opinion rejects the Government’s overly
broad interpretation.
I suggest a balanced, straightforward four-phase procedural framework
for how to properly litigate the monetary threshold question for deportation
purposes under M(i). When creating such litigation methodology, two
paramount principles must guide our way. First, the government must be
given a fair opportunity to satisfy its burdens of production and persuasion
20. Brief for Respondent at 12, 34–43, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009)
(No. 08-495).
21. At oral argument, Justice Souter summed up the petitioner’s argument as
follows: “So it seems to me that you’ve got to go the whole hog or get nothing, and the
whole hog is that it’s got to be an element of the offense that the loss exceed $10,000.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (No. 08495).
22. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (quoting Duenas-Alvarez,
549 U.S. at 186).
23. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38–40.
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that the dollar threshold under M(i) has been met, consistent with due
process to the alien, considerations of fairness, and Supreme Court dictates;
and second, the alien must be given a fair opportunity to dispute the
government’s argument that the monetary threshold has been satisfied.
Phase One: The government must present to the immigration judge
credible evidence from the underlying criminal file documenting loss to
the victim or victims of an amount greater than $10,000. Failure to come
forward with such evidence mandates a dismissal of the government’s
aggravated felony deportation charge under M(i), because the government
carries the burden on this issue.
I fully recognize that for a proper calculation of the amount of loss in
a circumstance-specific analysis in a fraud or deceit crime, as compared
with a pure categorical or modified categorical approach, the criminal
element focus is discarded and evidentiary standards are somewhat relaxed.
However, common sense and Supreme Court authority neither (a)
sanctions the use of unreliable information found in the alien’s criminal
file as grounds for deportation, nor (b) sanctions an entirely new
trial on the monetary threshold issues for deportation. Instead, under a
circumstance-specific approach, the government should be able to submit
only documentary evidence from the alien’s criminal file that maintains
traditional minimum guarantees of trustworthiness. As such, the
government should be restricted to the following documents from the
criminal file to satisfy its burden of persuasion for the monetary threshold
requirement:










8

State or federal statutory definitions of the offense or
offenses the criminal defendant was convicted of;
Official minutes of a court hearing, verbatim transcript,
abstract of record, or other court-prepared document
indicating the entry of conviction;
Charging documents, accompanied by sufficient evidence
(admission or otherwise) indicating what the defendant
actually pled to;
Trial court judgment or verdict;
Signed plea agreement;
Plea colloquy transcript;
Documents stipulated to as accurate that form the basis of
the conviction or sentence;
Defendant admissions made as part of his or her plea or
sentencing process;
Specific factual trial court findings, which the criminal
defendant admitted to or that are based upon a hearing
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where the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to be
heard and present evidence;
Trial court’s sentencing order;
Trial court’s restitution order;
Jury instructions and jury findings resulting in a guilty
verdict; and
Answers to special damage interrogatories propounded to
and answered by the jury with an accompanying guilty
verdict.

This list is referred to herein as “Reliable and Usable Evidence.”
Investigative reports (e.g., pre-sentence, probation, and police reports)
are notoriously untrustworthy and often contain a slanted view of reality
by utilizing multiple levels of unreliable hearsay.24 If an immigration
judge considered such reports for determining the monetary threshold
requirement under M(i) for deportation purposes, the alien respondent
would be forced into the unfair position of conducting an actual trial
defense of the statements contained in the report that might have happened
years earlier. The government should thus be precluded from using any
investigative reports found in the alien’s criminal file, unless the alien
expressly stipulated to the accuracy of such report. Likewise, the
government should be precluded from utilizing for deportation purposes
informal discussions on or off the record by counsel or the court.
Phase Two: The government must show that the damage threshold
has been satisfied for the actual criminal conviction, not for some other
crime or broader conspiracy for which no conviction was obtained. In
other words, the loss amount must be specifically tethered to the actual
offense of conviction and no other conduct.
Phase Three: The alien must be given a fundamentally fair opportunity
to dispute the government’s claim that a prior conviction resulted in the
24. See, e.g., Carlton F. Gunn, So Many Crimes, So Little Time: The Categorical
Approach to the Characterization of a Prior Conviction Under the Armed Career
Criminal Act, 7 FED. SENT’G REP., 66, 67 (1994) (“Presentence reports are notoriously
unreliable and, even where reliable, are only one summary of the evidence. If such reports are
considered, moreover, the defendant would presumably have to be allowed to try to
show that he or she did not really tell the probation officer what the probation officer
claims or that other reports or evidence upon which the probation officer relied were
erroneous. Consideration of the presentence reports will raise not only the problems of
‘mini-trials’ [sic] about events years past but also the problems created by translation of
those events through the multiple levels of hearsay which go into a presentence report.”).
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required loss to victims.25 Thus, the alien has “at least one and possibly
two opportunities to contest the amount of loss, the first at the earlier
sentencing and the second at the deportation hearing itself.”26
Phase Four: The government bears the burden of going forward and
the burden of persuasion (by clear and convincing evidence) that the
conviction for “fraud or deceit” resulted in a loss to the victim or victims
of greater than $10,000.27 Accordingly, the immigration court must assess
findings with an eye to what was actually lost as a result of the convicted
offense and the applicable standard for the government’s burden of
persuasion.28 Given the government’s burden of persuasion on this
issue, the immigration judge should weigh any uncertainties caused by
the passage of time in favor of the alien and against the government.29
III. PRE-NIJHAWAN: FINDING REMOVABILITY UNDER THE TAYLORSHEPARD CATEGORICAL APPROACH
All immigration proceedings “must conform to the Fifth Amendment’s
requirement of due process,” even though noncitizens are “not subject to
the full range of constitutional protections.”30 Accordingly, “an alien
who faces deportation is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims
and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.”31
Failure to afford an alien “a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence
against [him]”32 would result in a denial of due process if “the proceeding
was ‘so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably
presenting his case.’”33 When the government seeks to remove a lawful
permanent resident on the grounds of a criminal conviction, the government
bears the burden of proving both (1) the existence of a criminal conviction
and (2) that the conviction triggers a ground of deportability.34

25. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 41.
26. Id. at 42.
27. Id. See also INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012).
28. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42.
29. Id.
30. Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended);
see also Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012); United Sates v. ReyesBonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3168
(U.S. July 11, 2012) (No. 12-5286); Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709 (9th Cir.
2009) (order).
31. Colmenar v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS), 210 F.3d 967, 971
(9th Cir. 2000).
32. INA § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2012).
33. Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting IbarraFlores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006)).
34. See INA § 240(c)(3)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)-(B) (2012).
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Taylor involved an interpretation of a section of the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), which contains a provision similar to the
aggravated felony provision in the INA.35 It was Taylor that “established
the rule for determining when a defendant’s prior conviction counts
as one of ACCA’s enumerated predicate offenses.”36 The ACCA prescribes
a mandatory minimum sentence for any conviction involving the possession
of a firearm by a defendant who has a minimum of three prior convictions
for a “violent felony or serious drug offense.”37 Analogous to the INA, the
ACCA defines “violent felony” by listing certain enumerated offenses.38
Thus, the Supreme Court instructed sentencing courts to employ a twostep categorical approach when examining whether a prior conviction
qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.39
First, courts must determine whether the violation of the underlying
criminal statute includes every element of the generic offense listed in
the federal statute. If so, “the mere fact of conviction establishes that the
putative predicate crime was a violent felony.”40 In other words, the court
will find the defendant committed a violent felony when the elements of
the underlying conviction include all of the elements of the generic
federal definition.41
Courts should implement what has been referred to as the “modified
categorical approach” when the underlying criminal statute is divisible
(i.e., where a statute “comprises multiple, alternative versions of the
crime,” some of which constitute an element of the generic offense and
others that do not).42 Under this scenario, a conviction only qualifies as
a violent felony “‘where a jury was actually required to find all the
elements’ of the listed offense.” 43 As the Supreme Court recently
explained, the modified categorical approach is really nothing more than

35. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2011); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990).
36. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
38. See id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
39. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 602.
40. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Taylor, 495 U.S.
at 602).
41. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. In sum, “Taylor adopted a ‘formal categorical
approach’: Sentencing courts may ‘look only to the statutory definitions’—i.e., the elements—
of a defendant’s prior offense, and not ‘to the particular facts underlying those convictions.’”
Id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600).
42. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284.
43. Conteh, 461 F.3d at 53 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).
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“a tool for implementing the categorical approach.”44 It allows for the
examination of “a limited class of documents to determine which of a
statute’s alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant’s prior
conviction.”45 Most importantly, when a sentencing court is placed in a
position to determine actual jury findings, it must limit its inquiry to the
records of conviction, including the charging document and jury
instructions.46
In Shepard v. United States, the Supreme Court extended its categorical
approach articulated in Taylor to further include prior convictions that
were the result of a guilty plea rather than a jury trial.47 Again, the Court
reinforced the limited inquiry permitted under Taylor and determined
that only where the conviction record makes manifest that the defendant’s
plea necessarily constituted an admission to every element of a listed
offense may a sentencing court conclude the defendant pleaded guilty to
a violent felony.48 Specifically, the Supreme Court in Shephard defined the
“record[] of the convicting court”49 to include “the statutory definition,
charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy,
and any explicitly factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant
assented.”50 In Shepard, the Court:
[U]nderscored the narrow scope of [the sentencing court’s] review: It was not to
determine ‘what the defendant and state judge must have understood as the
factual basis of the prior plea,’ but only to assess whether the plea was to the version
of the crime in the Massachusetts statute (burglary of a building) corresponding
to the generic offense.51

In establishing the outer boundaries of the categorical approach, the
Court expressly rejected the Government’s argument that the scope of
the prior offense could be ascertained through facts alleged in a police
report.52 The Court reasoned that the limited inquiry was necessary to
effectuate Congress’s true intent of limiting the sentencing enhancement to
only those convictions considered to be violent felonies.53

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284.
Id.
Id.
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19–20 (2005).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 16.
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25–26).
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 23 & n.4.
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IV. PRE-NIJHAWAN: FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS’ DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF THE TAYLOR-SHEPARD CATEGORICAL
METHODS WHEN CALCULATING THE INA’S FINANCIAL
FRAUD AND DECEIT $10,000 THRESHOLD PROVISION
The federal circuits generally viewed the underlying rationale of Taylor
and Shepard as persuasive, and during the pre-Nijhawan years invoked
some form of the categorical approach in ascertaining whether an alien’s
prior conviction triggered immigration penalties under the INA. 54 The
circuits have not, however, reached agreement on the precise, proper
scope or application of the categorical approach in the immigration
context; the result has been confusing to say the least.55
Much of the inconsistencies in these immigration adjudications seem
to stem from the confusion caused by the wide-ranging discrepancies in
the state law penal statutes that form the basis of prior criminal
convictions. 56 Some federal circuit courts came to realize that the
elemental focus of the categorical approach “does not apply neatly to the
immigration statute.”57 As a result, the federal circuits have employed
different variations of the categorical approach, even going so far as to
abandon use of the categorical analysis for certain INA provisions.58

54. See Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing that
although the BIA and the courts of appeals have imported versions of the categorical
approach into the context of removal proceedings, there is “no universally accepted
definition of what constitutes a ‘modified categorical approach’ for immigration-law
purposes”); see also Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116,
125–26 (2d Cir. 2007); Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions:
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011).
55. Das, supra note 18, at 1679–80, 1711–19; see also Kawashima v. Mukasey,
530 F.3d 1111, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (discussing the
restrictive view of the modified categorical approach adopted by the court in NavarroLopez v. United States).
56.
See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Note, Categorical Approach or Categorical Chaos?
A Critical Analysis of the Inconsistencies in Determining Whether Felony DWI is a
Crime of Violence for Purposes of Deportation Under 18 U.S.C. § 16, 48 VILL. L. REV.
697 (2003).
57. Das, supra note 18, at 1677; see also id. at 1711–19; Dulal-Whiteway, 501
F.3d at 128 (“Statutes of conviction rarely correlate precisely with statutes of
removability . . . .”).
58. See Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 2008);
Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004).
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One provision in particular, the “fraud or deceit” aggravated felony
provision,59 under which the Government sought to deport Oviedo-Cortez,
exemplifies the pre-Nijhawan incongruous categorical analyses federal
courts pursued and the confusion they propagated.
A. Ninth Circuit: Strict Categorical Approach
The Ninth Circuit interpreted M(i)—the fraud and deceit provision—as
containing two elements: (1) the offense must involve fraud or deceit,
and (2) the offense must have resulted in a loss to the victim or victims
of more than $10,000.60 Because the Ninth Circuit viewed the $10,000
monetary threshold as an element, the court’s application of the TaylorShepard categorical approach led to removal only in the rare situation
that the noncitizen was actually convicted of both elements.61 Under this
strict categorical approach, the Ninth Circuit never found that the prior
conviction for financial fraud itself resulted in removal under M(i) because
it never encountered an underlying conviction that required proof of both
elements.62
As a result, the Ninth Circuit did allow usage of the modified categorical
approach to determine whether an alien’s underlying conviction qualified as
an aggravated felony.63 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit then looked to the
record of conviction to determine whether the jury found, or the criminal
defendant admitted to, a loss to the victim in excess of $10,000.64 The
Ninth Circuit limited its inquiry to a “‘narrow, specified set of documents,’”
including “‘the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a
signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the plea proceedings.’”65 But

59. INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012).
60. Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1114 (citing Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th
Cir. 2002)); see also Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. See Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1114.
62. See id. at 1114–15 (recognizing that subscribing to a false statement on a tax
return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and aiding and assisting in the preparation of
a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), does not require proof of monetary
loss in excess of $10,000); see also Kharana v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir.
2007); Scully v. Gonzales, 225 F. App’x 690, 692 (9th Cir. 2007); Haque v. Gonzales,
223 F. App’x 591, 593 (9th Cir. 2007); Fierarita v. Gonzales, 186 F. App’x 769, 771 (9th
Cir. 2006); Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004); Li, 389 F.3d at 897;
Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189–90.
63. See Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1114; Kharana, 487 F.3d at 128–84; Ferreira,
390 F.3d at 1098; Li, 389 F.3d at 897; Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189–90.
64. Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1115 (noting that four prior Ninth Circuit cases have
looked at conviction records to determine if the jury found or the defendant admitted to
the required loss (citing Kharana, 487 F.3d at 1284; Ferreira, 390 F.3d at 1098; Li, 289
F.3d at 897; Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189–90)).
65. Id. at 1114 n.4 (quoting Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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the Ninth Circuit refrained from “‘look[ing] beyond the record of conviction
itself to the particular facts underlying the conviction.’”66
In 2007, one year before the Supreme Court decided Nijhawan, the
Ninth Circuit in Kawashima v. Mukasey took an even more restrictive
view by precluding the immigration court from examining even the record
of conviction.67 The Ninth Circuit felt compelled to follow its decision in
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, which foreclosed this further inquiry, since
M(i)’s monetary loss requirement was an element of the of generic
offense.68 In Navarro-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit held:
The modified categorical approach . . . only applies when the particular elements in
the crime of conviction are broader than the generic crime. When the crime of
conviction [–e.g., subscribing to a false statement on a tax return–] is missing an
element of the generic crime altogether, [the court] can never find that “a jury
was actually required to find all the elements of” the generic crime.69

The court in Kawashima concluded that since the conviction statutes
did not require the Government to prove the amount of loss, no further
inquiry was permissible.70 Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
the application of Navarro-Lopez to M(i) essentially rendered the provision
null,71 since “there are almost no statutes that punish fraud and also specify
that the fraud must cause a loss of $10,000 or more,”72 it concluded that
Navarro-Lopez’s rule was “plain and clear” and, therefore, the preceding
cases were “impliedly overruled.”73 Additionally, the court recognized that
an alternate approach—namely, interpreting the monetary threshold of
M(i) as merely a qualifier rather than an additional element—would avoid
the anomalous consequence that resulted from applying Navarro-Lopez.74

66. Id. (quoting Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 620).
67. Id. at 1117–18 (concluding that Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales was binding
precedent, and therefore, the record of the Kawashimas’ convictions could not be consulted).
68. Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
69. Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1073).
70. Id. at 1115–16.
71. Id. at 1116–17 & n.7 (collecting examples of fraud violations).
72. Id. at 1120 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 1116 (majority opinion).
74. Id. (recognizing the approach of the Third and the Fifth circuits, as applied in
Singh v. Ashcroft and Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey) (citing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d
144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004); Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir.
2008)). Judge O’Scannlain’s concurring opinion also recognized that reformulation of
the modified categorical approach in Navarro-Lopez had no support from any
other courts of appeal and was decided without addressing the dissenting views of the
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But nevertheless, the court declined to adopt this alternative approach
because the Navarro-Lopez rule now “control[s the] modified categorical
analysis of aggravated felonies defined in Subsection M(i).”75
B. Second and Eleventh Circuits: Modified Categorical Approach
Allowing Examination of the Conviction Record
The Second Circuit has consistently found the Taylor-Shepard approach
instructive for establishing removability 76 under the INA. In DulalWhiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., the court noted four similarities
between the INA and ACCA77 as particularly persuasive in its decision to
extend Taylor’s rationale in the immigration context.78
In applying the categorical analysis to M(i), the Second Circ uit
acknowledged that “few statutes criminalizing fraud enumerate distinct
violations corresponding to the $10,000 loss amount required by the
[INA].”79 Under the Second Circuit’s version of the Taylor analysis,
other circuits or acknowledging the precedents it overturned. Id. at 1124 (O’Scannlain,
J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1118 (majority opinion). The court in Kawashima reasoned that the lone
authority relied upon by the en banc court in Navarro-Lopez, Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d
892, 899–901 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., concurring), was a quote from Judge Kozinski
stating, “he would not have examined the record at all because Subsection M(i)’s amount
of loss requirement ‘wasn’t an element’ of the statutes under which the petitioner had
been convicted.” Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1117 (citing Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at
1073).
76. Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 125 (citing
Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the categorical
approach to determine whether an alien was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
77. The sentencing statute at issue in Taylor was the Armed Career Criminal Act,
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
78. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 125–26 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at
117). First, the court noted that the INA’s the aggravated felony provision, like the
sentencing enhancement provision of the ACCA, applies only to aliens “convicted” of an
aggravated felony, not aliens who have merely “committed” an aggravated felony. Id. at
125 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117). Second, the court reasoned that “nothing
in the legislative history suggested a factfinding role for the BIA in ascertaining whether
an alien had committed an aggravated felony, just as, in Taylor, nothing suggested such a
role for the sentencing court in evaluating the factual basis of a prior burglary
conviction.” Id. at 125–26 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117). Third, the court
“found that the practical evidentiary difficulties and potential unfairness associated with
looking behind the offense of conviction were ‘no less daunting’ in the immigration than
in the sentencing context.” Id. at 126 (citing to Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117). Lastly,
the court recognized that the limited scope of the modified categorical approach
facilitated the immigration judge’s analysis by focusing on the “indictment or jury
instructions to determine the basis of an alien’s conviction.” Id. (citing to Ming Lam Sui,
250 F.3d at 117–18).
79. Id. at 126–28.
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the court must first determine whether the underlying statute is divisible.80
Only if the statute is divisible can the court consult the record of
conviction to determine whether the victim suffered the requisite amount
of loss.81 According to the Second Circuit, a statute is divisible “where
the removable and non-removable offenses they describe are listed in
different subsections or comprise discrete elements of a disjunctive list
of proscribed conduct.”82
The conviction at issue in Dulal-Whiteway, however, did not involve
discrete elements or different subsections.83 Rather, the criminal statute
prohibited obtaining anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more, by
the use of unauthorized access devices with the intent to defraud.84 The
Government argued that the court could consult the conviction records
because the statute was divisible since it “proscribe[d] some conduct that
is not removable—fraud causing a loss between $1000 and $10,000—and
some conduct that is removable—fraud causing a loss greater than
$10,000.”85 The Second Circuit agreed and looked to the record of
conviction to determine whether the amount of loss exceeded $10,000.86
Similar to the pre-Navarro-Lopez decisions of the Ninth Circuit, the
Second Circuit only considered sources specifically contained in the record

80. Id. at 126. The Supreme Court recently affirmed the Second Circuit’s approach as
the proper analysis for determining aggravated felony convictions in Moncrieffe v. Holder
and Descamps v. United States. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013);
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281–83 (2013).
81. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 126.
82. Id. at 126–27 (giving examples of cases involving divisible statutes); see, e.g.,
Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2001) (statute divisible); Dickson v.
Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2003) (statute divisible); Canada v. Gonzales, 448
F.3d 560, 567–68 (2d Cir. 2006) (statute not divisible).
83. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 123 (noting that the alien was convicted of
“knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized access
devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value
aggregating $1,000 or more during that period,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 126.
86. Id. at 128. See also supra text accompanying notes 62–74. The Ninth Circuit
did not use the terminology “divisible,” however, the issue regarding the record of conviction
and whether it may be examined was essentially the same. In Dulal-Whiteway, the
Second Circuit presumed it could consult the record of conviction, Dulal-Whiteway, 501
F.3d at 128, and the Ninth Circuit determined that Navarro-Lopez’s interpretation of
Taylor precluded the court from examining the record of conviction. See supra note 68
and accompanying text.
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of conviction.87 The Second Circuit looked to section 240(c)(3)(B) of the
INA, which lists the materials that may supply “proof of a criminal
conviction,” 88 and held that the “permissible materials include a charging
document (such as an indictment), a signed plea agreement, a verdict or
judgment of conviction, a record of the sentence; a plea colloquy transcript,
and jury instructions.”89
The Second Circuit expressly rejected the use of a presentence
investigation report [“PSR”] to establish the amount of loss.90 The court
expressed doubt regarding the reliability of PSRs since the primary
purpose of such reports is to aid the sentencing court and therefore often
contain background information and details about a crime drawn from
probation officers’ own interviews.91 Moreover, PSRs routinely describe
“‘conduct that demonstrates the commission of an offense even if the
alien was never convicted of it.’”92 The court concluded that the

87. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 128–29; see also supra text accompanying notes
65–66.
88. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 128–29. Section 240(c)(3)(B) of the INA provides:
(B) Proof of Convictions. In any proceeding under this Act, any of the following
documents or records (or a certified copy of such an official document or
record) shall constitute proof of a criminal conviction:
(i)
An official record of judgment and conviction.
(ii) An official record of plea, verdict, and sentence.
(iii) A docket entry from court records that indicates the existence of the
conviction.
(iv) Official minutes of a court proceeding or a transcript of a court
hearing in which the court takes notice of the existence of the
conviction.
(v) An abstract of a record of conviction prepared by the court in
which the conviction was entered, or by a State official associated
with the State’s repository of criminal justice records, that indicates
the charge or section of law violated, the disposition of the case,
the existence and date of conviction, and the sentence.
(vi) Any document or record prepared by, or under the direction of, the
court in which the conviction was entered that indicates the existence
of a conviction.
(vii) Any document or record attesting to the conviction that is maintained
by an official of a State or Federal penal institution, which is the
basis for that institution’s authority to assume custody of the
individual named in the record.
INA § 240(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2012).
89. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 129; see also Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44,
53 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the appropriate evidence admissible to prove a conviction).
90. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d. at 129.
91. Id. (referencing Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54).
92. Id. (quoting Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54) (emphasis in original).
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“unproven (and sometimes inadmissible) facts” included in PSRs are “an
inappropriate basis on which to rest a removal decision.”93
In addition, the Second Circuit also disagreed with the First Circuit and
followed a stricter interpretation of Shepard expressly rejecting the use of
a restitution order to prove loss.94 Although the court acknowledged that
Taylor and Shepard were criminal sentencing cases, it nonetheless found
the more restrictive inquiry convincing95 and therefore determined that
because “the amount of restitution is not constrained by facts on which
the plea ‘necessarily’ rested,” it could not be used to determine loss.96 Thus,
in rejecting both PSRs and restitution orders, the Second Circuit held:
For convictions following a trial, the BIA may rely only upon facts actually and
necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or judge in order to
establish the elements of the offense, as indicated by a charging document or
jury instructions. For convictions following a plea, the BIA may rely only upon
facts to which a defendant actually and necessarily pleaded in order to establish
the elements of the offense, as indicated by a charging document, written plea
agreement, or plea colloquy transcript.97

The court concluded that its holding was compelled by three principles: (1)
the plain meaning of the INA refers only to convicted conduct;98 (2) the
93. Id. (referencing Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54) (giving a thorough analysis of why
PSRs are unreliable). Careful criminal defense attorneys representing noncitizen clients
routinely object to the PSR findings.
94. Id. at 131–32 (rejecting the First Circuit’s approach, as demonstrated in Conteh v.
Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006), which found the INA dissimilar from the Taylor
and Shepard decisions, and held that a restitution order was appropriate evidence to
establish the requisite amount of loss).
95. Id. at 130 (noting that “Taylor and Shepard were sentencing decisions, and
differences between criminal punishment and the civil removal power might justify a
circumscribed application of those decisions in the latter context”). This was, however,
the First Circuit’s rationale in Conteh, 461 F.3d at 55 (“declin[ing] the invitation to transplant
the categorical approach root and branch—without any modification whatever—into the
civil removal context”).
96. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 130 (referring to Shepard’s instruction that when
determining whether a prior conviction in a pleaded case was based on a particular
offense, the court’s inquiry should be limited to facts on which “the plea had ‘necessarily’
rested,” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 602 (1990))).
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 131–32 (citing Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2001)).
The Second Circuit also explained that because the alien must be “convicted” of an
aggravated felony, the facts used to establish removability must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 132. Furthermore, the court noted the standard in civil removable
proceedings—clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence—would not be properly
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BIA and appellate courts are institutionally less competent “to re-adjudicate
the basis of prior criminal convictions;”99 and (3) general conceptions of
fairness—for example, “‘if a guilty plea to a lesser, [non-removable] offense
was the result of a plea bargain, it would seem unfair to [order removal]
as if the defendant had pleaded guilty to [a removable offense].’”100
The Eleventh Circuit adopted an approach similar to the one announced
by the Second Circuit.101 In Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney General, the
Eleventh Circuit, following its interpretation of Taylor-Shepard, first
conducted a categorical analysis to determine whether Obasohan was an
aggravated felon under M(i).102 Then, because Obasohan pled guilty to,
and was convicted of, one count of conspiracy to produce, use, and traffic
one or more counterfeit access devices,103 the court applied the Shepard
modified categorical approach.104 In its review of the immigration court’s
decision, the Eleventh Circuit chided the immigration judge for
“confus[ing] the issues of conviction and restitution.”105 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, it was plain error for the immigration judge “to rely solely
on the loss amounts contained in the restitution order as ‘clear, convincing
and unequivocal’ evidence.”106 The court explained in depth that, while
a sentencing court may consider “a broad range of relevant conduct, the
plain language of the INA requires that an alien have been convicted of
an aggravated felony to be removable.”107
The Eleventh Circuit found the restitution order insufficient as a matter
of law because the standard of proof required for the restitution order is
only a preponderance of the evidence, but loss must be established by
“clear, convincing and unequivocal” evidence in order to support a

satisfied if the immigration judge [“IJ”] were to rely on sentencing facts, which only
require the lower preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. See also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012).
99. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 132 (expressing concern about reviewing courts
acting as fact-finders and weighing evidence in a manner only appropriate for a criminal
jury); see also Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 119. Furthermore, the court acknowledged
that “[i]t was this very concern about collateral trials, and the oppressive administrative
burden they impose, that led the BIA to adopt (and [the second circuit] to endorse) the
categorical approach to removability in the first instance.” Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at
132 (citing Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 117–18; Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 264 (2d
Cir. 2000); Matter of Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 335 (B.I.A. 1996)).
100. Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 132–33 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02).
101. See, e.g., Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2007).
102. Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 788–91. See also supra text accompanying notes 37–47.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1), (b)(2) (2006).
104. Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789.
105. Id. at 790.
106. Id. at 789.
107. Id. at 790 (emphasis in original).
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finding of removal.108 Thus, according to the Eleventh Circuit, appellate
courts must confine their review to the record of conviction in order to
determine the facts upon which the alien’s prior conviction actually and
necessarily rested.109
C. First Circuit: Modified Categorical Approach Allowing Examination
of Restitution Orders in Addition to the Record of Conviction
The First Circuit consistently employed the modified categorical
approach to charges of deportability under M(i), but departed from its
sister circuits in Conteh v. Gonzales,110 in which it held that restitution
orders were part of the record of conviction.111 Similar to the Second
Circuit, the First Circuit consulted section 240(c)(3)(B) of the INA to
determine what evidence the immigration judge and the BIA may consider
in assessing whether an underlying conviction is an aggravated felony.112
The court also considered an implementing regulation containing a
catch-all provision stating, “[a]ny other evidence that reasonably indicates
the existence of a criminal conviction may be admissible as evidence
thereof.”113
Under the guidance of these statutes, the First Circuit reviewed the
evidence used by the immigration judge and the BIA to order the alien’s
removal.114 The court concluded that the statutes permit the BIA to
reference the indictment, the judgment, and the restitution order from the
antecedent criminal case because these “documents comprise ‘conclusive
[judicial] records made or used in adjudicating guilt.’”115 Elaborating on
the reliability of restitution orders, the court emphasized that, although
108. Id. at 791.
109. See id. at 789–90 (finding the INA analogous to the inquiry made by the
sentencing in court in Taylor and Shepard, and holding that the IJ erred by “not hav[ing]
relied on the statutory elements of the offense, the indictment, the plea or the plea
colloquy to conclude that Obasohan was convicted of an aggravated felony, as defined in
the INA”); see also Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 131. See also supra text accompanying
notes 63–65.
110. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006).
111. Id. at 59.
112. Id. at 57.
113. Id. at 57 (emphasis added) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) (2012)).
114. The First Circuit reviewed the indictment, the judgment, the restitution order,
the PSR, and the alien’s testimony at the removal hearing. Id. at 52, 58–59.
115. Id. at 59 (alteration in original) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,
21 (2005)).
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restitution orders alone are not dispositive of actual loss, “‘[t]he amount
of restitution ordered . . . may be helpful to a court’s inquiry into the amount
of loss to the victim’” where the district court makes an explicit finding of
loss as part of its final judgment and the restitution order corroborates
the district court’s finding.116
Conversely, the First Circuit rejected the BIA’s reliance on the alien’s
testimony and the PSR.117 The court reasoned that the catchall provision in
8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) authorizes the admission of evidence for the sole
purpose of proving “‘the existence of a criminal conviction,’” not the
authorization of evidence for the purpose of proving the facts underlying
the offense of conviction. 118 Because an alien’s testimony contains
“after-the-fact statements made in a separate and subsequent proceeding”
and the PSR contains narrative statements unrelated to the alien’s
conviction, these items are only useful to prove the existence of a
conviction, but not removability.119
D. Fifth and Third Circuits: Abandoning the Categorical Approach in
Favor of Examining the Underlying Facts
In Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
categorical and modified categorical approaches to determining loss
under M(i).120 The court stated, “[w]hen the amount of loss . . . is not an
element of an offense, the focus should not be limited to the conviction
itself.”121 Under this reasoning, the amount of loss is a “factual matter”122
that can be proven by looking beyond the record of conviction to documents
produced for sentencing purposes because “[t]he amount of loss is relevant
in a criminal prosecution primarily, if not exclusively, to sentencing.”123
Accordingly, “[w]hen a tribunal subsequently examines . . . the amount of

116. Id. at 61–62 (citing Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2003).
The court distinguished the restitution order in Conteh from those “artificially manipulated for
the sole purpose of influencing an alien’s immigration status” noting, “that award is not
controlling with respect to the amount of loss.” Id.
117. Id. at 58–59.
118. Id. at 58 (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d) (2012)).
119. Id. at 58–59.
120. Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 2008); see also
James v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2006) (representing the circuit’s first
departure from the categorical/ modified categorical approach under M(i)).
121. Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 177.
122. Id.
123. Id. Also note the court’s distinction between this and the modified categorical
approach– “The modified categorical approach accordingly restricts the documents that
may be consulted to determine whether a conviction was for a generic offense, and the
focus is, properly, on the conviction.” Id. (emphasis added).
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loss resulting from an offense, the reason for applying the modified
categorical approach does not fully obtain.”124
While relying on only a PSR, the Fifth Circuit held that the alien’s
guilty plea to a single count of filing a false tax return in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7206(1) was a removable offense pursuant to M(i).125 Rather
than requiring the Government produce the alien’s written plea
agreement,126 the Fifth Circuit accepted a chart in the PSR purporting to
show the amount of tax the alien owed for years 1996-2000 (including
$75,982 in 1999) as clear and convincing evidence that the circumstances
surrounding the alien’s conviction resulted in over $10,000 in loss to the
Government.127 To justify this holding, the court relied on the alien’s
failure to object to the facts in the PSR during the sentencing phase of
his conviction, the alien’s admission during sentencing that the amounts
contained in the PSR were correct, and the district court’s adoption of the
PSR as a factual finding.128 Surprisingly, the majority opinion never
mentions that the alien, in his removal proceedings, specifically denied
that his conviction resulted in a loss exceeding $10,000, or that he
consistently objected to the inclusion of the PSR.129 No other circuit
agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s use of a PSR alone as sufficient to establish
loss under M(i) by clear and convincing evidence as required by INA
section 240(c)(3)(A).
The Third Circuit also found that the language of M(i)’s loss
requirement permitted the immigration court to look at sentencing
documents to determine whether the alien’s underlying conviction caused a

124. Id. at 177–78.
125. Id. at 179–80.
126. Id. at 181 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The dissent calls attention to the “potential
of unfair practices, inequality of justice, and deportations based on constructive paper
trails,” id. at 180, when it points out,
[t]he DHS does not explain why it failed to introduce this crucial document into
evidence. If the written Plea Agreement discloses clearly that Arguelles underpaid
his 1999 taxes by more than $10,000, the DHS’s failure to file it has caused this
court to expend time and effort unnecessarily on the appeal, the oral argument and
the opinion writing on this issue. If the Plea Agreement does not contain clear
evidence to this effect, then a serious question is raised as to whether the DHS has
fairly dealt with Arguelles and honorably with this court.
Id. at 181 n.2.
127. Id. at 179 (majority opinion), 181–82 n.4 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 179 (majority opinion); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(C).
129. These concerns are raised in the dissent. Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 181–82
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
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loss of over $10,000 to the victim.130 The Third Circuit therefore discarded
the categorical approach in favor of a circumstance-specific method.
Manoj Nijhawan was born in India and immigrated to the United States
as a legal permanent resident in 1985.131 In 2002, Nijhawan was one of 15
defendants arrested and indicted for involvement in a massive “fraudulent
scheme to obtain hundreds of millions of dollars in loans from numerous
major banks.” 132 Of the fifteen defendants originally named in the
indictment, five (including Nijhawan) went to trial.133 On May 12, 2004,
the jury convicted Nijhawan of Counts One and Thirty of the indictment.134
Count One, the overall conspiracy count, contained a general loss allegation
as to the entire fraud scheme and involved conspiracy to commit bank
fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.135 Count
Thirty alleged conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).136 However, the jury was not asked to, nor did it,
determine the amount of loss attributable to any individual defendant,
including Nijhawan.137
Nijhawan entered into a stipulation—for sentencing purposes only—in
which he agreed that the total loss from his convicted offenses exceeded
$100 million, and therefore a twenty-six level enhancement was
warranted.138 When entering the judgment of conviction, the trial judge
filled in the space for “loss” with the amount “$683,632,800.23.”139
However, the trial judge held, and the Government expressly agreed, that
this amount was not a determination that Nijhawan had, in fact,
caused a loss in excess of $10,000.140 Nijhawan was sentenced to forty-

130. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006); Nijhawan v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., 523 F.3d 387, 394–95 (3d Cir. 2008).
131. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (No. 08-495).
132. Id. at 7; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 20, at 4.
133. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 7.
134. Id. at 7–8.
135. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 10. From the trial transcript:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . That’s the entire scheme issue, joint and several
liability, that any defendant could be held in effect responsible for all other
defendants. That’s not a finding of over $10,000 specific to this defendant.
THE COURT: I think that’s right. Do you agree with that [Assistant United
States Attorney (“AUSA”)]?
[AUSA]: Yeah, I think it’s right Your Honor, just the loss.
Id. at 10–11 (emphasis and alteration in original).
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one months of imprisonment and ordered to pay $683,632,800.23 in
restitution. 141
While Nijhawan was serving his sentence, DHS initiated removal
proceedings against him for committing an aggravated felony under
sections 101(a)(43)(D) and (M)(i) of the INA.142 The immigration judge
sustained both charges and entered an order of removal against Nijhawan
on February 22, 2006.143 On appeal, the BIA rested its decision upon the
M(i) charge.144 In the BIA’s written decision,145 the single-member panel
looked beyond Nijhawan’s record of conviction to determine the amount
of loss and “held that the stipulation, judgment of conviction, and restitution
order were ‘sufficient to establish that [Nijhawan’s] conviction renders him
removable.’”146
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Nijhawan argued that the BIA erred by
establishing loss based on evidence outside of the record of conviction,
particularly the sentencing documents.147 Nijhawan argued that the BIA
was bound by the modified categorical approach and could only consult
the limited set of documents from the criminal trial to satisfy the loss
requirement of M(i).148 Specifically, Nijhawan contended that, since the
jury did not, and was not instructed to, make a finding of loss under the
statute of conviction, his conviction was not an aggravated felony within
the meaning of the INA.149 Conversely, the Government argued that the
language of M(i) allows the immigration judge and the BIA to consider

141. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389.
142. Id. DHS later amended the charge under M(i) to add a charge under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(U) (2012) (attempt to commit an aggravated felony). Brief for the
Respondent, supra note 20, at 6–7.
143. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389.
144. Id.
145. The BIA’s decision was a written, non-precedent decision issued by a single
board member on August 8, 2006. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 12.
146. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 390 (citing the BIA’s decision from the A.R.); Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 131, at 12.
147. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 391.
148. Id. at 391–93, 396–97, 400 (Stapleton, J., dissenting). The dissent referenced
decisions by the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in which the courts limited their
inquiry to the record of conviction under the modified categorical approach. Nijhawan,
523 F.3d at 400. See Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116,
128 (2d Cir. 2007); Li v. Ascroft, 389 F.3d 892, 895–98 (9th Cir. 2004); Obasohan v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 788–89 (11th Cir. 2007); see also supra Parts IV.A,
IV.B.
149. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 389.
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any evidence from the criminal record to determine “what loss was, in fact,
occasioned by or attributable to the offense of conviction.”150
Ultimately, the Third Circuit concluded that the language of M(i) “does
not require a jury to have determined that there was a loss in excess of
$10,000 [because] [t]o read the ‘in which’ language as requiring that what
follows must have been proven as an element of the crime would bring
about an absurd result.” 151 The court expressly departed from the
restrictions of the categorical and modified categorical approaches of
Taylor and Shepard, stating, “[t]he ‘in which’ qualifying language renders
the analysis under [M(i)] different from the approach in Taylor and
Shepard.” 152 “Accordingly, our Court’s precedent directs us to ‘examine
the facts at issue,’ because the amount of loss is a ‘qualifier,’ not an
element.”153
Under this interpretation of M(i), the BIA was permitted to rely on
evidence outside of the record of conviction to satisfy the loss
requirement.154 Therefore, the only issue left for the court to decide was
“whether the ‘tether’ of a loss in excess of $10,000 to Count 1 . . .
[was] sufficiently strong” to provide clear and convincing evidence that
the requisite amount of loss was tied to Nijhawan’s offense of conviction.155

150. Id. at 391.
151. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)).
152. Id. at 392.
153. Id. at 393–94. The court references the following precedent:
(1) Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2003), where Defendant was
not required to plead guilty to a loss amount for removal under INA
§ 101(a)(43)(M)(i). Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 394 (citing Munroe, 353 F.3d
225). Instead, the court looked to the indictment “which contained an
averment as to loss in excess of $10,000, rather than an amended restitution
order, which reduced defendant’s restitution to $9,999.” Id. (citing
Munroe, 353 F.3d at 227). However, the court stated that under different
circumstances, “‘the amount of restitution ordered as a result of a
conviction may be helpful to a court’s inquiry into the amount of loss to
the victim if the plea agreement or indictment is unclear as to the loss
suffered.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Munroe, 353 F.3d at 227); and
(2) Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006), which stands
for the proposition that “one who has admitted to a loss of less than
$10,000 as part of a guilty plea cannot later be said to have been
convicted of an offense involving fraud in which the loss to the victim
exceeds $10,000.” Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 394. “Alaka requires only that
we ‘focus narrowly on the loss amounts that are particularly tethered to
the convicted counts.’” Id. at 394–95 (citing Alaka, 456 F.3d at 107).
154. Id. at 395–96.
155. Id. at 395.
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E. Lower Court’s Development of the Tethering Requirement
In Nijhawan, the Third Circuit declined to address the “nature of the
nexus required” (i.e. the “tether”) between the conduct of which the alien
was actually convicted and the amount of loss required by the statute.156
Most courts, however, had already explicitly required that “what constitutes
an ‘aggravated felony’ for purposes of the INA must be tethered to
convicted conduct.”157 In other words, only conduct of which the noncitizen
was actually convicted may count towards fulfilling the $10,000 loss
requirement of M(i).
The BIA has also recognized that “additional conduct that was not
‘particularly tethered to convicted counts’ cannot satisfy the [Government’s]
burden . . . under . . . the Act . . . [because] a restitution order based upon
additional evidence which is only proven by a “preponderance of evidence”
during the criminal proceedings cannot satisfy the DHS’s burden of proving
an aggravated felony by “clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence.”158
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Knutsen v. Gonzales159 reasoned that
“‘consistent with the statute . . . the court should focus narrowly on the loss
amounts that are particularly tethered to convicted counts alone.’”160
Because the loss figure contained in the stipulation was based on both
convicted and unconvicted conduct, the court held that it was error for
the immigration judge and the BIA to rely on the alien’s stipulation as
proof of the actual loss.161
The tethering requirement is in line with “the plain and unambiguous
language of the [INA], which predicates removal on a convicted offense,”162
and it functions as a limit on what evidence the government may use
(and subsequently, what the judge may review) in removal proceedings.
Thus, when determining whether the noncitizen’s conviction actually
caused greater than $10,000 in loss, the immigration judge may only

156. Id.
157. Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 2007); see also
Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2005).
158. In re Osarias Monday Omoregbee, No. A29891115, 2007 WL 2299662, at *2
(B.I.A. July 17, 2007) (citing Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789–90).
159. Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2005).
160. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 396 (alteration and emphasis in original) (citing
Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 739–40).
161. Id. (citing Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 739).
162. Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 736 (emphasis in original).
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consult documents in the criminal record that are explicitly tethered to
the noncitizen’s conviction.
In spite of strong support for strict adherence to the tethering
requirement under the modified categorical approach, the Third Circuit
reversed its course and joined the First and Fifth Circuits in allowing
removal to be based on documents that were not explicitly tethered to
Nijhawan’s criminal conduct.163 Notwithstanding its past claims to the
contrary,164 the Third Circuit claimed that case law “requires an ‘inquiry
into the underlying facts of the case’ to ascertain whether the ‘in which’
qualifying loss provision is satisfied.”165 In support of its broader inquiry,
the court cited the First Circuit’s decision in Conteh and the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Obasohan.
The Third Circuit relied on the reasoning in Conteh, wherein the
First Circuit recommended a focus on the loss occasioned by the conviction,
rather than loss as an element to be found by the jury or explicitly
incorporated in the plea agreement.166 However, the court in Conteh
noted that the distinction between “‘conviction for and commission of an
aggravated felony is an important one; because the BIA may not adjudicate
guilt or mete out criminal punishment, it must base removal orders on
convictions, not on conduct alone.’”167
The Third Circuit also found that its own circuit precedent provided that
“the loss amount need not be found specifically by the jury or set forth in
the plea agreement or colloquy.”168 In Alaka v. Attorney General, the Third
Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Knutsen to hold that
courts must “‘focus narrowly on the loss amounts that are particularly
tethered to the convicted counts.’”169 In Alaka, the total loss alleged in the
noncitizen’s indictment exceeded $10,000, but this amount was connected
with the overall scheme the noncitizen was involved in, not the single
count to which the alien pleaded guilty.170 Because the noncitizen’s plea
agreement only referenced a loss to the victim of $4,716.68 resulting from
the alien’s actual conviction,171 and all other counts against the alien were

163. See supra Parts IV.C–IV.E
164. Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 396–999. The Third Circuit repeatedly claims that it
has not abandoned the Taylor-Shepard approach or the tethering requirement. Id.
165. Id. at 396.
166. Id. at 395 (citing Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006)).
167. Id. at 395 (emphasis in original) (quoting Conteh, 461 F.3d at 56).
168. Id. at 397.
169. Id. at 394–95 (citing Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 107 (3d
Cir. 2006)).
170. Id. at 394 (citing Alaka, 456 F.3d at 92).
171. Id. (citing Alaka, 456 F.3d at 92).
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dismissed as a result of the plea agreement,172 the Third Circuit held that
“[w]here there is a plea agreement that sets forth the loss it is to that
agreement [the court] must look to determine the loss.”173
Lastly, the Third Circuit cited the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Obasohan 174 in support of its review of the sentencing documents as long
as the amount of loss is tethered to the underlying conviction.175 As
previously mentioned, the noncitizen in Obasohan had been ordered to
pay restitution due to fraudulent charges on other credit cards that were
not the subject of the indictment or the plea agreement.176 The Eleventh
Circuit held it was an error to rely on the noncitizen’s PSR and restitution
order as clear and convincing evidence of loss because the PSR and
restitution order “[were] based entirely on other unconvicted conduct . . .
‘that was alleged only in the [PSR].’”177
Although Nijhawan urged the court to depart from its case law and
follow the approach of the Second and Ninth Circuits,178 the Third Circuit
held that since “the loss requirement invites further inquiry into the facts
underlying the conviction, . . . that inquiry is satisfied if the amount of loss
is sufficiently tethered to the fraud conviction.”179 Therefore, the court
concluded that “taken together, the indictment, judgment of conviction, and
stipulation provide clear and convincing evidence that the requisite loss
was tied to Nijhawan’s offense of conviction.”180
V. NIJHAWAN : THE SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF THE TAYLORSHEPARD CATEGORICAL APPROACH FOR THE INA’S
FINANCIAL FRAUD AND DECEIT $10,000
LOSS THRESHOLD PROVISION
The Supreme Court recognized the disagreement among the circuits
and granted certiorari, framing the issue as,

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2007).
Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 396 (citing Obasohan, 479 F.3d 785).
Id. (citing Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789–90).
Id. (quoting Obasohan, 479 F.3d at 789–90).
Id.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 395.
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whether the italicized statutory words ‘. . . in which the loss to the . . .
victims exceeds $10,000’ should be interpreted . . . as referring to a generic
crime, or . . . as referring to the specific way in which an offender committed
the crime on a specific occasion.181

The Court explained that if the statutory words referred to a generic
crime, an appropriate monetary threshold must be included in the statute
defining the offense.182 If, however, the words of the statute referred to
the specific circumstances of the offender’s crime, the loss may be
determined by looking to the facts and circumstances underlying an
offender’s conviction.183
The Supreme Court held that the “fraud and deceit” provision calls
for a “circumstance-specific,” not a “categorical,” interpretation, rejecting
Nijhawan’s argument in favor of the categorical approach.184 The Court
reasoned that despite some similarities between the ACCA and the INA,
the ‘fraud and deceit’ provision of the INA was sufficiently different from
the ACCA’s provisions to necessitate departure from the categorical
approach.185
The Court acknowledged that the aggravated felony statute of the INA
“resembles the ACCA in certain respects;”186 both contain a list of
generic offenses and require the court to determine whether the defendant’s
conviction meets the generic definition.187 But the Court went on to note
that the crucial difference between the ACCA and the INA is that some
of the offenses in the INA “us[e] language that almost certainly does not
refer to generic crimes but refers to specific circumstances.”188 To illustrate
this point, the Court referred to aggravated felony provisions (P) and (N)
181. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 36. The Court referred to the Third Circuit’s approach as “circumstancespecific” because it allowed a court to examine the underlying circumstances of the
crime, and it referred to the Ninth and Second circuit’s approach as “categorical,” as
adopted from Taylor. Id. at 34.
185. Id. at 36.
186. Id. at 37 (comparing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), the provision of the INA that
defines aggravated felony, to the ACCA).
187. Id. (recognizing that “aggravated felony” is defined by certain generic crimes
such as, “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)).
188. Id. At oral argument, Justice Souter also noted:
The fact is also that this provision, the $10,000 figure, was placed into the
statute at a time when Congress was trying to expand the category of deportable,
removable offenses, and it would be passing strange in that context to define
the offense by reference to a $10,000 figure as an element of the offense which
would cut it down, which would cut the compass of the statute down to three
offenses.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 13.
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as examples. According to the Court, these provisions contain language
that “cannot possibly refer to a generic crime . . . because there is no such
generic crime.”189 For instance, subsection (P) refers to convictions for
making false passports, but also exempts “a first offense for which the
alien . . . committed the offense for the purpose of assisting . . . the alien’s
spouse.”190 The Court reasoned that “if the provision is to have any
meaning at all, the exception must refer to the particular circumstances in
which an offender committed the crime on a particular occasion.”191
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Nijhawan, if a noncitizen is
charged as deportable under one of the provisions of the INA that contains
a factual circumstance clause, such as the M(i) requirement of greater
than $10,000 in loss, immigration courts should apply the categorical (or
modified categorical) approach to the elemental part of the offense and
the circumstance-specific approach to the factual part. Thus, the Court
sanctioned use of certain documents outside of the record of conviction to
ascertain whether the requisite factual circumstances accompanied
the noncitizen’s criminal conviction.192
VI. POST-NIJHAWAN : WHAT CONSTITUTES CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE UNDER A CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS?
The Supreme Court’s holding in Nijhawan expanded the legal analysis
for certain aggravated felony provisions to include an examination of
the factual circumstances surrounding the alien’s conviction. But the
Court failed to clearly define the scope of this evidentiary inquiry.
In one respect, the Court’s lack of guidance is understandable given
the facts of the Nijhawan case. In Nijhawan, there was no question that
the alien’s criminal conduct caused over $10,000 in loss. In fact, the alien
stipulated for the sentencing hearing that the loss exceeded $100 million.193
As the Supreme Court concluded, the immigration judge’s reliance on
Nijhawan’s stipulation and the corroborating restitution order, in the
absence of any conflicting evidence, was clear and convincing evidence that

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 37.
Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(P) (2012).
Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 32.
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“the conviction involved losses considerably greater than $10,000.”194 But
that was an easy case.
The Nijhawan Court’s adoption of the circumstance-specific analysis
has led the government to tout an array of sentencing and other documents,
previously insufficient on their own, as adequate evidence to meet its
clear and convincing burden. Whatever qualms one may have with the
Supreme Court’s departure from the categorical approach in Nijhawan, it
is clear that the bigger concern is the effect of its holding on evidentiary
standards in post-Nijhawan immigration courts. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many courts, like the immigration court in Oviedo-Cortez v.
Holder, have grossly misconstrued the clear and convincing standard under
the circumstance-specific inquiry.
A. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Requires Reliable
Evidence Consistent with Supreme Court Precedent
and the INA
The government “must meet a ‘clear and convincing’ [evidence]
standard” 195 before it can remove a lawful permanent resident for
committing an aggravated felony under M(i). This standard is less
burdensome than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more burdensome
than a preponderance of evidence standard.196 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines clear and convincing evidence as “[e]vidence indicating that the
thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.”197 Typically,
the ultimate burden of proof in civil proceedings is proof by a
preponderance of evidence—the party carrying this burden will prevail if
there is enough evidence to make the desired outcome more likely than
not.198 However, the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Woodby v.
INS, setting the burden of proof in removal proceedings for lawful
permanent residents, held that proof by a preponderance of evidence
was not sufficient given the severe consequence of deportation.199 The
Woodby Court stated:
The immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that inflicted by
denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in expulsion from
our shores. And many resident aliens have lived in this country longer and

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 42.
Singh v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
Woodby v.INS., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
Id. at 286.
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established stronger family, social, and economic ties here than some who have
become naturalized citizens.200

Accordingly, the Court held that “no deportation order may be entered
unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.”201
The Woodby decision was codified in section 240(a)(3)(A) of the INA,
which states,
[i]n the proceeding the [Government] has the burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to
the United States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability shall be
valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. 202

According to the legislative history cited by the Woodby court:
“The requirement that the decision of the special inquiry officer shall be based
on reasonable, substantial and probative evidence means that, where the decision
rests upon evidence of such a nature that it cannot be said that a reasonable
person might not have reached the conclusion which was reached, the case may
not be reversed because the judgment of the appellate body differs from that of
the administrative body.”203

To fully understand the government’s clear and convincing burden of
persuasion under INA section 240(a)(3)(A), this burden, along with the
requirement that evidence be reasonable, substantial, and probative, must
be read in context with what the INA requires the government to prove.
INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) states that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”204 Therefore,
the plain language of the statute dictates that the government must prove
by a high probability or a reasonable certainty that an alien’s underlying
conviction meets the definition of an aggravated felony through evidence
“of such a nature that it cannot be said that a reasonable person might
not have reached the conclusion which was reached.”205

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. INA § 240(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012).
203. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 30 (1952). The House
Report contains substantially identical language. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 57 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653.).
204. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (emphasis added).
205. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 284.
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B. Clear and Convincing Evidence in Post-Nijhawan Courts
Post-Nijhawan courts have held that an alien’s admission or stipulation to
an amount of loss over $10,000 in the plea agreement is sufficient to
meet the government’s burden of clear and convincing evidence .206
Similarly, post-Nijhawan courts have allowed the government to rely on
restitution orders to meet its burden of proof.207 But some courts have

206. See Varughese v. Holder, 629 F.3d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding alien’s
admission during plea colloquy to three fraudulent transactions in excess of $10,000 was
clear and convincing evidence); see also Doe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 659 F.3d 266,
276 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the plea agreement, including stipulation that the alien’s
conduct caused between $120,000 and $200,000 in losses, is clear and convincing
evidence); see Kawashima v. Holder, 615 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding Mr.
Kawashima stipulated in his plea agreement that the “total actual tax loss” associated
with his conviction of submitting a false statement on a tax return was clear and
convincing evidence of loss); see Carlos-Blaza v. Holder, 611 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the Government established loss by clear and convincing evidence with the
alien’s stipulation and corresponding restitution order for $65,000); Al-Sharif v. U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 10-1435, 2012 WL 1440225, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr.
25, 2012) (“Plaintiff agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and the
parties stipulated that the loss attributable to Plaintiff’s crime ‘exceeded $120,000 but was
less than $200,000.’ . . . Plaintiff’s conviction clearly constitutes an aggravated felony
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).”).
207. See Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. App’x 80, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding restitution
order of $350,001 “for [convicted] loss” constituted clear and convincing evidence); see
also DeGomez v. Holder, 471 F. App’x 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding restitution
order, supported by alien’s stipulation to $18,594 of loss, was sufficient to meet clear
and convincing standard); Rivas-Marin v. Holder, 469 F. App’x 521, 522 (9th Cir. 2012)
(finding restitution order for $37 million plus alien’s admission to fraudulently inflating
the value of several real estate properties by more than $100,000 each was clear and
convincing); see Relvas v. Holder, 382 F. App’x 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The BIA took
note that Relvas was ordered to pay $106,827.78 in restitution, [] and thus the BIA
‘engage[d] the evidence he presented’ and provided Relvas with a ‘reasoned analysis’ as
to why that evidence suggested a loss in excess of $10,000.” (citing Mohideen v. Gonales,
416 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 2005))); Rosario-Bencosme v. Holder, 424 F. App’x 34, 34–
35 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding restitution order for $5,600,000 resulting from alien’s conviction
for “acquiring, possessing, using, and redeeming approximately $5,600,000 worth of
[United States Department of Agriculture] food stamp coupons in a manner contrary to
[law]” and corroborating statements from alien’s plea colloquy was clear and convincing
evidence of loss); Pilla v. Holder, 458 F. App’x 518, 521 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding the
restitution order and sentencing memorandum in which the alien admitted to loss
exceeding $10,000, but less than $30,000 is clear and convincing evidence of loss); see
Olawale-Ayinde v. Holder, 416 F. App’x 629, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the guilty
plea, judgment, and restitution order that “specifically referenced only those counts to
which [the alien] had pled guilty” were sufficient to establish loss by clear and convincing
evidence); Zmeeva v. Holder, 480 F. App’x 245, 246 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding restitution
order of $36,514.52 was sufficient evidence to “support[] the finding that Zmeeva’s
conviction was an aggravated felony”); Yepes v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F. App’x 320,
324 (11th Cir. 2012) (allowing consideration of restitution order in determining loss amount
exceeded $10,000).
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carelessly accepted restitution orders that encompass unconvicted conduct
to equate to clear and convincing evidence.208 Additionally, courts have
accepted information in an alien’s plea agreement regarding loss and
statements made by the alien during the plea colloquy to assist the
government in satisfying its burden of proving loss by clear and convincing
evidence.209 This often occurs where the same amount of loss is stated in
the indictment, guilty plea, and sentence order.210 Even factual allegations
regarding loss contained in an alien’s criminal information have been
held to constitute clear and convincing evidence.211 Some courts, however,
have limited the admission of the criminal information to the situation
where the alien was convicted of (or pled guilty to) all of the counts
contained in the indictment.212
Some courts have allowed the use of PSRs, but most limit such use
only to corroborate factual allegations in other documents, such as the plea
208. See Ragbir, 389 F. App’x at 83–84 (noting that restitution in a fraud case can
include compensation for uncharged conduct closely related to the scheme); see also
Mahfouz v. Holder, 400 F. App’x 165, 166 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the BIA’s holding
that the restitution order attributing losses caused by the alien and co-conspirators was
“substantial evidence” of loss and sufficient to removed alien under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(M)(i)); Ezeigwe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 491 U.S. 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[A]lthough Ezeigwe’s restitution order operates as a civil judgment for enforcement
purposes, it does not change the underlying criminal nature of the restitution. [Because]
Ezeigwe does not dispute that he agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $100,000 at
the plea hearing[, . . . the Court was] satisfied that the loss amount was tethered to the
actual conviction in this case.”).
209. See Chhabra v. Holder, 444 F. App’x 493, 495 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he plea
colloquy, and the guilty plea itself all clearly indicate that the amount of revenue loss to
the United States Government exceeded $42,000.”); see also In re Sampathkumar, 2010
WL 3780676, at *4 (B.I.A. 2010) (“Under Nijhawan, we hold that [the plea colloquy] is
sufficient to satisfy the loss requirement of section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act, even
though it may have included losses relating to other misconduct as well as that in the
count of conviction.” (emphasis added)).
210. See Ibe v. Holder, 406 F. App’x 23, 26 (6th Cir. 2010).
211. See Rosario-Bencosme, 424 F. App’x at 35 (“There is ‘nothing unfair’ about
the BIA’s determination that the Government satisfied its burden of demonstrating the
requisite loss by clear and convincing evidence when it presented the criminal information
and restitution order.”); see also Masoud v. Holder, 487 F. App’x 633, 636 (2d Cir. 2012).
212. See Orozco De Anda v. Holder, 354 F. App’x 588, 590 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
the guilty plea to conduct that was explicitly tied to $1.3 million in loss clear and convincing);
Bazuaye v. Holder, 452 F. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding the PSR and restitution
order were clear and convincing evidence of loss exceeding $10,000); DeMedeiros v.
Holder, 461 F. App’x 633, 635 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the state court certified
information and abstract of judgment were clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s
victims suffered more than $10,000 of loss).
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agreement, judgment of conviction, restitution order, or criminal
information.213 A few courts have improvidently allowed an unchallenged
PSR alone to satisfy the government’s burden of clear and convincing
evidence.214
C. Misapplication of the Nijhawan Holding to Shift the
Burden of Persuasion
Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a
sentencing court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence
report as a finding of fact.”215 This sentencing rule should not be taken as
an invitation to shift the burden of persuasion to the alien defendant in a
deportation proceeding.
Regrettably, in applying the circumstance-specific analysis, some courts
allow the government to satisfy its burden of persuasion and establish
the amount of loss by relying solely on an uncontested PSR. 216 In
doing so, these courts justify accepting the government’s minimal showing
of evidence as clear and convincing so long as the alien had at least one
“‘fair opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior conviction
involved a fraud with the relevant loss to victims.’”217 However, an
immigration court’s rubber-stamping of any unchallenged evidence the
government presents should not necessarily amount to clear and convincing
evidence in deportation proceedings. Instead, these courts, in such
213. See Ragbir, 389 F. App’x at 83–84 (accepting the Government’s offer of an
unchallenged PSR, together with the indictment and judgment of conviction, to establish
loss by clear and convincing evidence); Kaplun v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 602 F.3d 260,
266 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that the PSR and criminal information alleging that the
alien’s conviction of securities fraud caused nearly $900,000 of loss was clear and
convincing); Rodney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 393 F. App’x 859, 861 (3d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2883 (2011) (holding that the PSR and restitution order are sufficient
to support the finding that the alien caused a loss of $23,450.21); Tian v. Holder, 576
F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that the plea agreement, PSR, and restitution order
meet the clear and convincing standard).
214. See Munez-Morales v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 379 F. App’x 210, 217 (3d Cir.
2010) (finding that the PSR alone was enough for clear and convincing evidence because
the court was not “made aware of the existence of any other evidence that is alleged to
contradict the [PSR] . . .”); Familia v. U.S. Atty Gen., 507 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir.
2012) (using the PSR to find that loss exceeded $10,000).
215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A); see Munez-Morales, 379 F. App’x at 213 (noting that
the sentencing court expressly adopted the facts of the PSR); see Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266
(noting that the loss in PSR was adopted by the district court).
216. See Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 178–79; see also Munez-Morales v.
Attorney Gen. of U.S., 379 F. App’x 210, 217 (3d Cir. 2010); Familia v. U.S. Atty Gen.,
507 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2012).
217. Ibe v. Holder, 406 F. App’x 23, 28 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nijhawan v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)).
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situations, may be in reality impermissibly shifting the burden of persuasion
to the alien respondent, and thereby requiring the alien respondent to
successfully rebut the charges against him, regardless of whether the
government has actually met its mandated burden of persuasion.
An even more disturbing trend is the increase in immigration courts
that have found clear and convincing evidence where the alien fails to
produce evidence that conflicts with the government’s evidence. These
courts, relying on Nijhawan, have ordered deportation in “‘the absence
of any conflicting evidence.’”218 The Supreme Court’s language in
Nijhawan, that “[t]hese considerations, taken together, mean that petitioner
and those in similar circumstances have at least one and possibly two
opportunities to contest the amount of loss, the first at the earlier sentencing
and the second at the deportation hearing itself,”219 does not support this
conclusion. Such commentary merely identifies the ability for the alien to
present evidence in response. Any attempt to shift the ultimate burden of
persuasion away from the government, which creates a presumption of
removability that an alien must rebut, is fundamentally wrong.
This befuddled, unjustified acceptance of the government’s untrustworthy
and unrebutted evidence has now become routine. For example, this
improper burden-shifting approach might indeed be present in Kaplun v.
Attorney General, wherein the Third Circuit says that the Government
satisfied its burden with “unrebutted evidence” and specifically pointed to
“the documented lack of objection” to a PSR as clear and convincing
evidence.220 Another example might have occurred in Munez-Morales
v. Attorney General,221 in which the court’s decision relied on the
Government’s sole piece of evidence, an undisputed PSR. The Third
Circuit held that the alien’s failure to object to statements contained in the
PSR during the presentencing hearing and the lack of contradictory
evidence met the clear and convincing standard in a subsequent removal
proceeding. 222 The courts should not allow the government to satisfy
its burden of persuasion through the use of unreliable evidence just

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266 (quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 43).
Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42.
Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 273.
379 F. App’x 210.
Id. at 216–17.
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because the alien does not object or introduce evidence conflicting with
the government’s evidence.223
Any shift of the burden, whether intentional or not, is a sweeping
misapplication of the Supreme Court’s holding in Woodby and Nijhawan,
and is not permitted under the INA. The law is well-defined—when the
government moves to deport a legal permanent alien residing in the United
States under M(i), it is the government’s burden, and the government’s
alone, to produce reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence that the
alien’s underlying conviction caused over $10,000 in actual losses by clear
and convincing evidence.224 Though immigration proceedings are civil
in nature, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized “the unique nature
of deportation” as a “particularly severe ‘penalty.’”225 In fact, the Supreme
Court recently acknowledged that “‘[p]reserving the [alien’s] right
to remain in the United States may be more important to the [alien] than
223. See Ragbir v. Holder, 389 F. App’x 80, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Ragbir points
to nothing in the record that precluded the agency, as a matter of law, from making a
clear and convincing finding that the $350,001 restitution order included more than
$10,000 attributable to the crimes of conviction.”); Rosario-Bencosme v. Holder, 424 F.
App’x 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding that “[t]here is ‘nothing unfair’ about the BIA’s
determination that the government satisfied its burden of demonstrating the requisite loss
by clear and convincing evidence when it presented the criminal information and restitution
order, and Rosario–Bencosme did not present any conflicting evidence” (emphasis added)
(citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42)); Orozco De Anda v. Holder, 354 F. App’x 588, 590–
91 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Thus, the government introduced clear and convincing evidence that
the funds involved here were ‘tied to the specific count[ ] covered by the conviction,’ . . .
and Orozco has failed to point to any evidence that rebuts this fact.” (emphasis added)
(quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42)); Munez-Morales, 379 F. App’x at 217 (“Given that
Munez–Morales had ample opportunity to object to any factual findings he considered
improper and failed to do so, and given that we have not been made aware of the existence of
any other evidence that is alleged to contradict the pre-sentencing report’s estimate that
over $400,000 was laundered, we can find no fault with the Board’s conclusion that
there was clear and convincing evidence that the amount of money laundered by the
conspirators exceeded $10,000.” (emphasis added)); Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266 (“[T]he
absence of any objections to the PSR by Kaplun, and the absence of any conflicting
evidence (and [Kaplun] mentions none), this evidence is clear and convincing.” (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 43)); Rodney v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.,
393 F. App’x 859, 861 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Rodney did not challenge the content of the PSR
at his sentencing before Judge Marrero, who then ordered him to pay restitution to Fleet
Bank in the amount of $23,450.21. App. 394. This evidence is sufficient to establish that
Rodney caused an actual loss to Fleet Bank of more than $10,000, [and] that he was
therefore convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ . . . .”); Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 896
(8th Cir. 2009) (“Tian has not identified any evidence indicating that the portion of the
investigative costs attributable to his unauthorized access to a computer came to $10,000
or less. As a result, we conclude that the IJ and the BIA correctly determined that Tian’s
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony.”).
224. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012).
225. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).
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any potential jail sentence.’”226 The Supreme Court’s understanding that
legal permanent residents are deserving of heightened constitutional
protection directly translates to the varying standards of proof under the
INA.
D. A PSR Should Never Be Considered Clear and
Convincing Evidence
The government’s prolific and unsettling use of PSRs in removal
proceedings has, on occasion, received the tacit approval of the immigration
courts and the federal circuits since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Nijhawan. Yet these courts fail to realize that this use of PSRs falls outside
any notion of fairness and should never be considered reliable evidence
(let alone clear and convincing evidence) that an alien’s underlying criminal
conviction was an aggravated felony. Moreover, with the exception of
the Fifth Circuit’s Arguelles-Olivares decision, most federal circuits prior to
Nijhawan condemned the use of PSRs to establish the amount of loss
occasioned by the defendant’s conduct.227
When rejecting the use of PSRs, most courts criticized them as inherently
unreliable228 and as insufficient evidence to satisfy the government’s clear
and convincing burden of persuasion in an immigration context.229 The
Second Circuit summed up the inherent untrustworthiness of a PSR as
follows:
The PSR is a tool used in aid of sentencing, and typically describes conduct that
demonstrates the commission of an offense even if the alien was never convicted for
that activity. . . . Because the factual narratives contained in the PSR are
prepared by a probation officer on the basis of interviews with prosecuting attorneys,
police officers, law enforcement agents, etc., they may well be inaccurate. They

226. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2013) (quoting Padilla, 559
U.S. at 368).
227. See supra Parts IV.A–IV.D.
228. See Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2003); see also LaraChacon v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); John P. Fullam, Coping With
the Sentencing Guidelines, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 335, 335–36 (1998) (“For a variety of
reasons, unreliable and exaggerated estimates can find their way into Presentence Reports,
and defense counsel may be reluctant to object, for fear of jeopardizing the credit for
complete acceptance of responsibility.”).
229. See Dickson, 346 F.3d at 53–54; United States v. Valenzuela-Hernandez, 72
F. App’x 686, 686 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Solis-Torres, 16 F. App’x 1, 2 (9th
Cir. 2001) (“The bare statements in the PSR do not amount to the clear and convincing
evidence necessary to support his sentencing enhancement.”).
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may include allegations that were not proven at trial, as well as alleged facts
that would have been inadmissible at trial had the prosecution attempted to
present them.230

According to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[t]he
probation officer must conduct a presentence investigation and submit a
report to the court before it imposes sentence” on the convicted
defendant. 231 A PSR often contains additional legal and factual information
referring to the defendant’s criminal] history, financial impact on the victim,
and when a legal bases for restitution exists, information sufficient for a
restitution order.”232 None of this additional information is proven in the
previous criminal proceeding; in fact, it is usually background information
drawn from probation officers’ own interviews that “describes conduct
that demonstrates the commission of an offense even if the alien was never
convicted for that activity.”233 And while unconvicted and even acquitted
conduct may be pertinent for sentencing purposes,234 the use of “unproven
(and sometimes inadmissible) facts [are] an inappropriate basis on which to
rest a removal decision.”235 Otherwise, an alien may be removed based
upon unconvicted conduct or because the alien failed to effectively dispute
certain inculpatory facts at the sentencing hearing.
An immigration court’s consideration of “unconvicted facts” contained in
the PSR also improperly allows the government to shirk its burden of
proving removability by clear and convincing evidence. During the
sentencing hearing, once a defendant objects to factual statements in a
PSR, the sentencing court may then only rely on those facts if the
government proves them by a preponderance of the evidence.236 Once
the government proves the additional facts by a preponderance of the
evidence, the sentencing court may accept them as findings of fact. As
previously mentioned, the same is true for an undisputed section of the
PSR.237 While this may be the rule in the sentencing context, immigration
courts should not be permitted to rely on the PSR to establish the amount
of loss for deportation purposes.

230. Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54; see also Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that it is “virtually inevitable” for PSRs to contain inaccurate information
and hearsay statements).
231. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A).
232. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)–(D).
233. Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54.
234. Obasohan v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 2007).
235. Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 129 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing Dickson, 346 F.3d at 54).
236. See United States v. Charlesworth, 217 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2000).
237. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A).
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The government’s push to use documents outside of the record of
conviction lends credence to a more deliberate strategy to avoid its
heightened burden of proof. What is even more regrettable is the Third
Circuit’s acceptance of this impermissible lower standard of proof. In
Munez-Morales, the Third Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding
in Nijhawan as “reject[ing] any artificial limit on the evidentiary sources
to which the court can look in determining whether the government has
carried [its] burden.”238 This is simply not an accurate portrayal of
Nijhawan. Although the Supreme Court refused to accept Nijhawan’s
suggested limits, it never condoned the use of a PSR to justify removal.
The use of a fully admitted stipulation to prove the amount of loss is wholly
distinguishable from the use of a PSR. Indeed, the entirety of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Nijhawan was that, given the lack of any conflicting
evidence, the petitioner’s own stipulation to a loss considerably greater
than $10,000 and the criminal trial court’s restitution order showing the
same amount constituted clear and convincing evidence.239 Nothing more
and nothing less was noted. The government has incorrectly construed
Nijhawan to support its use of any document it can gather from the alien’s
criminal file.
VII. WHAT EVIDENCE SHOULD BE USED TO PROVE LOSS UNDER M(I)?
A. Implementing a Four-Phase Procedural Framework: Ensuring
Due Process Procedures and Allowing Admission
of Only Reliable Evidence
Courts should not be bashful in defining the precise scope of the
circumstance-specific inquiry under two important governing principles (as
first noted above):
1. The government must be given a fair opportunity to satisfy
its burden of persuasion that the dollar threshold under
M(i) has been satisfied, consistent with due process afforded
to the alien, fairness, and Supreme Court dictates; and

238. Munez-Morales, 379 F. App’x at 216 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29,
41–43 (2009)).
239. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42–43.
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2. The alien respondent must be given a fair opportunity to
dispute any such governmental argument that the monetary
threshold has been satisfied.
Adoption of one of these procedural guarantees does not presuppose the
exclusion of the other; both can be present in a fair and balanced approach.
This article attempts to provide a sensible four-phase framework.
Phase One (Presentation of Government Evidence): This initial phase
allows the government to present to the immigration judge credible
evidence from the underlying criminal file in an attempt to satisfy its
burden of persuasion. Such evidence should be limited to Reliable and
Usable Evidence, as defined above. This list of usable evidence gives
flexibility to the government by allowing proof outside of what is normally
considered part of the conviction record; the government can thus not
only use a plea colloquy under this method, but also may use defendant
admissions, trial court sentencing orders, and trial court restitution orders.
This is not, however, an open invitation for the government to bring in
anything found in the criminal file. Such inquiry should be limited to those
documents identified as Reliable and Usable Evidence. Permitting evidence
outside these documents puts the alien in an untenable position to combat in
minitrials the unreliable information paraded before the immigration
judge.
Phase Two (The Tethering Requirement): This phase mandates that
the government show from the Reliable and Usable Evidence submitted
that the damage is specifically tethered to the actual conviction. This is one
of the central requirements of the circumstance-specific analysis enunciated
in Nijhawan.240 As previously mentioned, the aggravated felony provision
of the INA predicates removal on the basis of a convicted offense.241
Accordingly, using the circumstance-specific analysis of the monetary
threshold under M(i), the only way removal continues to be predicated upon
a convicted offense is through the tethering of the loss to the conviction.242
Even prior to Nijhawan, both the Seventh and Third Circuit reasoned
that “the ‘loss’ must ‘be tied to the specific counts covered by the
conviction.’”243 Unlike the stipulation in Nijhawan, the stipulation in
Knutsen included conduct that was not limited to the loss caused by the
240. Id. at 42.
241. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (providing
that any “alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is
deportable”).
242. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 40–41, 42 (rejecting Nijhawan’s argument to adopt
a modified-categorical approach).
243. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42 (citing Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733, 739–40
(7th Cir. 2005) and Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 107 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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actual offense of conviction; therefore, it was error for the immigration
judge and the BIA to rely on the alien’s stipulation as proof of the actual
loss.244 However, after Nijhawan, courts became less rigid in holding the
government to the tethering requirement. Especially when cases became
more complicated, i.e., when an alien is charged with multiple counts,
but not convicted for all of the counts, courts have erroneously begun to
use the amount of loss for the entire scheme as clear and convincing
evidence of the actual loss caused by the individual alien.245
Additionally, even the Government’s position in Nijhawan supports
the view that the loss inquiry is limited to the evidence tethered to the
criminal conviction. The Government agreed that any inquiry into the
underlying facts must be “tied to the specific counts covered by the
conviction.” 246
Phase Three (Full and Fair Opportunity for Alien to Contest): This
phase provides the alien respondent a fair procedural opportunity to
challenge the government’s claim that the monetary threshold has been
satisfied under M(i). The Supreme Court in Nijhawan specifically
acknowledged this right, indicating that the INA removal statute “foresees
the use of fundamentally fair procedures.”247 This would include a “fair
opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior conviction involved
a fraud with the relevant loss to victims.”248
Phase Four (Immigration Judge Assessment): This phase requires
the immigration judge to critically assess the evidence, taking into
consideration the government’s heightened burden of persuasion, with
an eye toward determining the actual loss for the convicted offence. For
example, the immigration judge cannot take as absolute proof the amount
stated in the restitution order. Indeed, as admitted by the Government
during oral argument in Nijhawan, the loss calculated for criminal
sentencing does not equate to the loss for deportation purposes:
Justice Alito: . . . [D]oes the government have a theory about how the loss is
measured for purposes of this statute? Under the sentencing guidelines, the loss
was a very complicated calculation, lots of rules about relevant conduct and lots
of cases and different ways of proving loss, and here we just have the statute.

244. Nijhawan v. Attorney Gen. of U.S.,523 F.3d 387, 396 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing
Knutsen, 429 F.3d at 739).
245. See Doe v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 659 F.3d 266, 275–76 (3d Cir. 2011).
246. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42.
247. Id. at 41.
248. Id.
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[Government Lawyer]: Yes, we think that it is not necessarily the same as the
loss determination that would be made for sentencing. And so, the board has
made it very clear that even though a restitution order, for example, can be sufficient
evidence of loss to the victim, that it needs to be assessed with an eye to exactly
what losses were determined in the underlying restitution order and with regard
to the burden of proof there.249

The Government further conceded that the restitution order and even a
criminal defendant stipulation to such order is not dispositive in a
deportation hearing:
[Government Lawyer]: Well, I—I think that we are not taking the position that
the—the stipulation for sentencing purposes, which was pursuant to (6)(B) of
the guidelines and was for stipulation purposes—we’re not arguing that that
is—is dispositive in the—in the civil removal proceeding.250

The Government also seems to acknowledge the difficultly of proving
removal under M(i) even with the “easy” facts presented in Nijhawan:
[Government Lawyer]: Well, I—if we had that amount of evidence in this case,
we had sentencing stipulations and all sorts of determinations at the time of the
sentencing where the defendant did not even try to argue that this wasn’t
actually the amount of loss associated with his offense and conviction, then we
probably would be able to establish by clear and convincing . . ..251

Adoption of this four-phase procedural framework would give all
parties a much-needed certainty in future matters. The government would
know exactly what it could draw upon as admissible evidence and the alien
and his criminal lawyer would, at the criminal trial stage, know the exact
ramifications of admitting to the truth of any of these documents.
B. A Circumstance-Specific Analysis Does Not Warrant a
Minitrial for the Admission of Newly
Created Evidence
In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court noted “that the ‘sole purpose’ of the
‘aggravated felony’ inquiry ‘is to ascertain the nature of a prior conviction;
it is not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.’”252 But the Court
left the door open a crack for a circumstance-specific inquiry to ascertain
the actual factual circumstances surrounding the individual’s conviction
and the resulting loss.
Given the opportunity, the government would remove the door entirely
and allow newly created evidence to flood the immigration court. Under
249.
250.
251.
252.
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this process, both parties would be equally able to engage in discovery, call
witnesses, present new evidence, and examine the opposing party’s
evidence. But anyone familiar with our Nation’s overburdened immigration
courts would recognize this as a procedural fantasy and would realize that
this puts the alien in an unfair position.253 As the Supreme Court pointed
out in a recent decision on a different aggravated felony provision, forcing a
noncitizen respondent to relitigate the factual circumstances surrounding
his conviction puts the noncitizen at a severe disadvantage since
“noncitizens are not guaranteed legal representation and are often subject
to mandatory detention.”254 Incorporating a limitless factual inquiry into the
noncitizen’s criminal conviction in the immigration proceeding is at odds
with the longstanding principle that “the relevant INA provisions ask
what the noncitizen was ‘convicted of,’ not what he did, and the inquiry in
immigration proceedings is limited accordingly.”255
The Supreme Court recently reiterated in Moncrieffe v. Holder its
disapproval of “relitigati[ng] . . . past convictions in minitrials conducted
long after the fact.”256 Allowing minitrials during immigration proceedings
would convert such proceedings into the “post hoc investigation into the
facts of predicate offenses that [the Supreme Court has] long deemed
undesirable.”257 In Moncrieffe, the Government relied on Nijhawan in its
argument that “[n]oncitizens should be given an opportunity during
immigration proceedings to demonstrate that their predicate marijuana
distribution convictions involved only a small amount of marijuana and
no remuneration, just as a federal criminal defendant could do at
sentencing.”258 The Supreme Court rejected the Government’s proposed
minitrials as “entirely inconsistent with both the INA’s text and the
categorical approach,” since they would only frustrate the primary and
“practical” purpose of the categorical approach, to promote “judicial and
administrative efficiency.”259 Although lambasting the Government for
suggesting “case-specific factfinding,” which would only invite the
“potential unfairness” that the system has long sought to avoid, the Court

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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does leave some wiggle room by way of dicta as to whether such a minitrial
would be appropriate in the circumstance-specific examination context.260
I would strongly urge that the already-mentioned procedural and
substantive concerns that counsel against minitrials apply equally to the
circumstance-specific analysis. Without any real limitation on the type of
evidence the government can present or a means of leveling the playing
field for the detained respondent, an inquiry into the factual circumstances
of a conviction will allow the government to satisfy its burden by pointing
to any document it might find, irrespective of its reliability, authenticity,
and relationship to the noncitizen’s actual conviction.
One indication that this view is more appropriate is the underlying Third
Circuit opinion in Nijhawan, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.261
Similar to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit determined that the
monetary threshold of subparagraph M(i) was not an element of the
offense.262 Still, the Third Circuit referenced “the prior criminal record”
at several points throughout the opinion.263 Just as the Supreme Court did,
the Third Circuit held that the determination of loss requires the court to
“examine the facts at issue.”264 However, the Third Circuit expressly
limited the inquiry into the facts as evidenced in the prior criminal
record.265
Furthermore, the tension among the circuits, which led to the Supreme
Court granting certiorari, primarily involved the extent of inquiry into
the prior criminal record.266 The most limited inquiry, used by the Ninth
260. Id. at 1690–91.
261. See Nijhawan v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 523 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2008).
262. Id. at 391–92; Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 29 (2009).
263. See, e.g., Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 391 (“The issue remains, however, whether
the language ‘in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000’ requires that a
jury have actually convicted defendant of a loss in excess of $10,000, . . . or permits
resort to the prior criminal record in order to determine what loss was in fact occasioned
by or attributable to the offense of conviction.”) (emphasis added); id. at 395 (“[H]ere,
we need only determine whether the record is sufficiently clear that the loss resulting
from the convicted conduct exceeds $10,000.”) (emphasis added); id. (noting that it is
not the only “court of appeals to have viewed the inquiry into the record of conviction to
permit examination of loss not specifically admitted in the plea colloquy or agreement or
found by a jury as part of the conviction”) (emphasis added); id. at 397 (“[W]e endorse
careful consideration of the record to determine whether it is sufficiently clear that the
loss connected to the crime of conviction exceeded $10,000.”); id. at 399 (“It is well
within the competence of a court to examine the record for clear and convincing evidence
of loss caused by the conduct of conviction.”) (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 393–94.
265. See id. at 391.
266. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 33 (recognizing that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have
[reached] different conclusions as to whether the $10,000 threshold in subparagraph
(M)(i) refers to an element of a fraud statute or to the factual circumstances surrounding
commission of the crime on a specific occasion” and listing the relevant circuits to
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Circuit, prohibited examination into the prior criminal record where the
underlying offense did not include an appropriate monetary threshold.267
The most lenient approach, used by the Fifth Circuit, allowed the
Government to prove loss by presenting a PSR.268 But under either side of
this spectrum, the government was never afforded a wide-open trial; only
evidence from the underlying criminal conviction was considered.
In Matter of Babaisakov, the BIA analyzed both the scope and reliability
of evidence that may be used to establish the monetary threshold. 269
In doing so, the BIA correctly rejected use of the modified categorical
approach270 and shifted its analysis to the evidence contained in the
record of conviction.271 Eventually, the BIA concluded that any evidence
relied upon “must be assessed with an eye to what losses are covered and to
the burden of proof employed.”272 In other words, the BIA was concerned
with the burden imposed on the government and ensuring that the victim’s
loss is established by clear and convincing evidence.273 Specifically, the
compare). Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Nijhawan, every circuit court to
consider the issue limited the inquiry of loss to the prior criminal and sentencing proceeding.
See, e.g., Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting the use of a
PSR to determine loss, but allowing an indictment, judgment indicating loss, and
restitution order); Nijhawan, 523 F.3d at 395 (permitting loss to be evidenced by the
defendant’s stipulation of loss during sentencing, judgment of conviction, and restitution
order); Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 178–79 (5th Cir. 2008) (permitting
loss to be established solely by a PSR); Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 131 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting inquiry into both a PSR and restitution
order and requiring loss to be established by facts to which the defendant actually and
necessarily pleaded, as indicated by a charging document, written plea agreement, or
plea colloquy transcript); Kawashima v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008)
(prohibiting the record of conviction from being consulted entirely where the underlying
criminal offense did not include an element of loss in excess of $10,000); Obasohan v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 791 (11th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a restitution order and
requiring loss to be established by the criminal information, plea, judgment or sentence).
267. See Kawashima, 530 F.3d at 1117.
268. See Arguelles-Olivares, 526 F.3d at 179.
269. Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 307 (B.I.A. 2007).
270. Id. at 316–18.
271. Id. at 318–20.
272. Id. at 319. The Supreme Court quoted the BIA on this point in the Nijhawan
opinion. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 (2009) (“[T]he Board of Immigration Appeals,
too, has recognized that immigration judges must assess findings made at sentencing
‘with an eye to what losses are covered and to the burden of proof employed.’” (Babaisakov,
24 I. & N. Dec. at 319)).
273. See Babaisakoy, 24 I. & N Dec. at 319–20. The BIA also explained that the
amount of loss will suffice to meet a clear and convincing showing only if the loss
resulted from the conduct related to the particular charges or criminal counts covered by
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BIA contended that the record of conviction was “an uncertain source of
reliable information on loss to the victim” because such records sometimes
contain facts proved only by a preponderance of the evidence standard.274
Despite the BIA’s stated concerns with the reliability of evidence and
holding the government to its burden of proof, the language of its opinion
seems to leave open the possibility of a minitrial where newly created
evidence is submitted.275 Given the current state of the law, however,
reliance upon the BIA’s decision in Matter of Babaisakov for the
proposition that there are no limitations on what the immigration judge
may consider during the factual circumstance inquiry is misplaced.276 The
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of the BIA opinion only referred to the
section instructing courts how to determine loss using the “record of
conviction”277 and thus limited its approval of the BIA’s decision to the
admonition to immigration judges to “assess findings made at sentencing
‘with an eye to what losses are covered and to the burden of proof
employed.’” 278 No justification exists to allow a wide-open trial before
the immigration judge determines the amount of loss from the conviction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is understandable that a federal statutory mechanism exists for the
deportation of legal resident aliens engaged in extreme wrongful behavior.
Congress has thus decided (through the INA) that a “noncitizen who has
been convicted of an ‘aggravated felony’ may be deported from this
country.”279 Such allegations are quite serious, especially since, if proved,
they take away all discretionary relief from removal “no matter how
compelling” the case may be.280

the conviction. Id. at 320 (citing Alaka v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 107–08
(3d Cir. 2006)) (proposing that “even a plea to a fraudulent transaction exceeding $10,000, or
a sentencing fact found beyond a reasonable doubt, may be suspect if the admission or
sentencing factor covered losses associated with transactions outside the particular count
or counts covered by the conviction”).
274. Id. at 320–21 (noting that the record may contain sufficient evidence of loss,
but that it is not always the case).
275. See id. at 321 (“[W]e discern no sound reason for prohibiting Immigration
Judges from considering other reliable evidence that bears on this question, including but
not limited to the testimonial admissions of the respondent made during the removal
hearing.”).
276. See id.
277. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42; Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 319.
278. Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 42 (citing Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 319).
279. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
280. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1682.
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With so much at stake, we must be ever mindful that even noncitizens
have both a statutory and constitutional right to a full and fair hearing.281
“[I]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything
upon insufficient evidence.”282 In sum, I find no justification for the
government to use new evidence not in the original criminal conviction file;
and I find no support for the government to forage the criminal defendant’s
criminal file in hopes of finding something, even untrustworthy documents,
that announce the minimum damage threshold for deportation. In our
system, a napkin found in the criminal file with $10,001 claimed damages
scribbled on it should never suffice.

281. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); INA § 239(a)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a)(1)(D) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2012).
282. WILLIAM K. CLIFFORD, The Ethics of Belief (1877), in THE ETHICS OF BELIEF
AND OTHER ESSAYS 70 (Timothy J. Madigan ed., 1999).
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